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Risk-Based Oversight of 
Experiments in the Environment 
T H E  NEW BIOLOGY H A S  C:OME OF AGE. BASIC RESEARCH I N  fields ranging from irnn~unology to plant biology has bccn transformed so as to  be almost unrccognizablc to thosc 
whose biology education ended bcforc 1970. Thc spillover into 
conuncrcial development likewisc has been remarkable. Hardly a 
weck passes without news of some new advance in an area such as 
therapeutics, vaccines, or plants and animals for food, feed, or fiber. 
Thcse uses of biotechnology in "containcd" laboratories, pilot 
plants, greenhouscs, and production facilities havc cngcndered littlc 
controversy. Thc National Institutes of Health Guidelines for 
Research Involving Recombinant DNA havc cxcmptcd from ovcr- 
sight morc than 95% of laboraton. experiments (1); this has allowed 
okanisms of low risk to be handle2 under modest contairmlcnt 
cond~tlons that pcrmlt largc numbcrs of l ~ v ~ n g  organisms to bc 
present In the \i~orkplace and e\ en to  be released from the laboraton. 
i2) .  Despite extensi;,e work in thousands of laboratories throughout 
thc United States with millions of ~ndividual genetic clones, there 
- 
has been no report of thcir causing a human illncss nor any injun to 
the cnvironment. 
A bleak spot in this picturc is tcsts in the environment, oftcn 
termed ficld trials, planncd introductions, or delibcratc rclcascs. A 
number have bccn subjectcd to cxtrcmc regl laton scrutiny and 
lengthy delays solely bccausc rccombinant DNA techniques wcrc 
cmploycd in the manipulation of the organism. This has occurred 
even when the gcnctic change was complctcly characterized, benign, 
and thc organism demonstrably innocuous. The ripple effects have 
bccn substantial. Investigators havc shied away from arcas of 
research that requirc field trials of recombinant organisms ( 3 ) ;  
companies have fclt con~pelled to  cschcw thc newest, most prccisc 
and pon,crful techniques in favor of cruder but lcss regulated ones 
(4);  and investors have avoided companies whose recombinant 
DNA<ieri\,ed products requirc ficld trials (5). 
Govcrnmcnt agencies haf,r variously regulated new biotcchnolo- 
gy products with prcviously existing rcgimcs or crafted new ones. 
Whcthcr new or old, ccrtain cardinal principles apply. First, triggers 
to regulation-thc criteria for thc ovcrsight net-must be scientifi- 
cally dcfcnsible. Second, thc degree ofovcrsight must bc commcnsu- 
rate \vith risk. Thus, thc regulation schcrne generally should be risk- 
bascd. Some have contended that this is-obvious in thconr but 
difficult to  achle~e In practlce Critlcs of r~sk-bascd o\crslght 
contend that ~f \ve knew a prior] what cxpcrllnents wcrc riskv, we 
would have littlc nccd for risk asscssmcnts-and that at the outset we 
could just csclnpt those proposals that posc negligible risk. This is a 
specious assertion. The United Statcs and other nations have oftcn 
deviscd regulaton nets bascd on assumptions about the magnitude 
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or thc distribution of risk. For csample, we require pcrrnits for field 
trials with ccrtain organisms considered to be plant pests, wherea!: 
w7c cxempt similar organisms on the basis of a knowlcdgeabl(: 
assessment of predicted relative risk; a specific exa~nplc is thc: 
classification of ,4j,~uohncteri~rrn tumefariet~s as a pest undcr the rcgula- 
tions of the Plant Pest Act, whcreas closely related ,4,yuokartevium 
mdiokacter is cxempt from regulation. Thc validity of these assump- 
tions determines the integrity of the regulatory schcmc; without 
them, we might as well flip a coin or cxcmpt field trials proposcd on 
certain days of the week. 
The federal govcrnmcnt's 1986 "Coordinatcd framework for the 
rcLgulation of biotechnolog)." focused oversight and rcg~llatory 
triggcrs on thc charactcristics of products and on thcir intended use, 
rather than on processes uscd for genetic manipulation. For cxarn- 
ple, in choosing altcrnativcs to process-based approachcs, the Envi- 
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) "carehlly considered how well 
the options approximated risk," attempting to define expcrimcnts 
that havc "high potential for widcsprcad exposure, adverse c%kcts, 
or uncertainty concerning potential effects to  deserve particular 
regulatory scrutiny" (6).  
Sincc the coordinated framcwork was published, both the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the EPA havc labored to 
create oversight regimes for tests in the environment. They have 
bencfited from National Acadcmy of Sciences (NAS) and National 
Rcsearch Council (NRC) policy documents. Among the most 
significant conclusions and recornmendations from the NAS policy 
statcment arc thc following: (i) "ltlhere is no evidcncc of the 
cxistencc of unique hazards cithcr in thc usc of rDNA [ rcco~nbin~~nt  
DNA] techniqucs or in the movement of genes between unrelated 
organisms" ( 7 ,  p. 22); (ii) "ltjhe risks associatcd with the introduc- 
tion of rDNA-engineered organisms arc the same in kind as those 
associated with the introduction of unmodified organisms and 
organisms modified by other methods" (7, p. 22); and (iii) "[alssess- 
ment of the risks associatcd with introducing rccombinant DNA- 
engineered organisms into the environment should bc bascd on the 
nature of the organism and the cnvironment into which it is 
introduced," (7, p. 22) and independent of thc rncthod of engineer- 
ing. 
In a more comprehensive report on this subject, an NRC 
committec concluded that (i) thc p ~ o d u c r  of gcnctic modification and 
sclcction constitutcs the priman basis for decisions about the 
environmental introduction of a plant or microorganism, and not 
the process by which the product was obtained; (ii) although 
k~io\vledgc about the process uscd to produce a genetically modified 
organism is important in understanding the characteristics of the 
product, the nature of thc proccss is not a useful criterion for 
dctcrmining thc amount of oversight; and (iii) organisms modified 
by modern ~nolecular and cellular methods are governed by the salnc 
physical and biological laws as arc organisms produced by classical 
mcthods ( 8 ) .  The N R C  proposed to base the evaluation of experi- 
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mental field testing on  three considerations: familiarity, that is, 
similari? to  introductions with a safe histon; abili? to confine or 
control thc spread of the organism; and likelihood of harmful ctfects 
in casc of a mishap. 
In spite of this guid'mce, scvcral rcccnt regulaton proposals have 
bccn based on process. Thc Europcan Economic Conununin 
(EEC) recently adoptcd process-bascd directives ( 9 )  that are applica- 
blc to both containcd uses and planned introductions of genetically 
modified organisms and are likcly to hindcr research and de\relop- 
mcnt throughout Europc. 
A similar recent domestic proposal for process-based regulation in 
the United States \vould require case-by-casc risk assessment for all 
rDNA-manipulated organisms with p h e n o ~ p c s  that d o  not exist in 
naturc bccausc such organisms are "unfamiliar," and by cstension, 
high risk ( 3 ) .  The proposal focuses on a proccss-determined defini- 
tion of "familiari?," and inappropriately cquatcs this with safcty. 
The proposal exempts from o\rcrsight esperimcnts with organisms 
that arc "familiar," dcfined solely by thc test organisms being 
"nanlral" or having bccn crcated by oldcr, more "familiar" gcnctic 
manipulation techniques. If an organism meets this definition, it is 
exempt from this rcgulaton net, howcvcr pathogenic, invasivc, or 
othcnvise \vorrisomc it may be. 
Can one devise a scientifically dcfcnsiblc, risk-based schemc for 
o\.ersight that is also \vorkable? We think so, and propose an 
algorithm for which we havc borrowed from prcvious ideas and 
proposals of government agencies, primarily N I H  and the USDA. It 
is based on the naturc of the organism and of thc site into \vhich the 
organism is to bc introduced, and is adaptable to  thc dcmands of 
many ovcrsight and rcgulaton agcncics. Thc algorithm accommo- 
dates any organism, whcthcr "natural," onc that has been selected by 
an!. technique, or onc that has bccn manipulated by long-cstablishcd 
or nc\v techniques of genetic engineering. 
In ordcr to  asccrtain thc dcgrcc of o\rersight of a w i l d - ~ p e ,  
unmodified, or parental organism required in a ficld trial, we first 
dcterminc thc o\rcrall Ic\~cl of concern on thc basis of scientific 
knowledge and expcrience as compiled and tabulated by cxpcrts. 
That Icvcl of safety concern is cntcrcd into another tablc in which 
thc "confinement Icvcl," that is, the site and conditions for the 
expcrimcnt, is considered; this cnablcs us to  read off the Icvcl of 
required ovcrsight. Thc Icvcls can include exempt, notification of a 
local biosafety committee, prior appro\ral by a local biosafc? 
corlul~ittee, notification of a federal agcncy, or prior approval by a 
fcderal agency. In such a schcmc, the relation among le\rels of safety 
conccrn, confincmcnt, and oversight can be varied to  take into 
account concerns such as the desircd amount of scnitiny, public 
perceptions, and the rcgulaton burden on researchers and the 
govcmment. 
In ordcr to  dctcrmine the dcgrce of oversight of an organism 
altered from wild type by any process, we proceed as bcfore but add 
one step. Aftcr ascertaining the initial "overall Icvcl of concern," we 
dctcrnmine w,hcthcr the modification has altered thc s a f c ~  h e l .  If 
so, that new le \d  of safe? concern is used to establish the dcgrce of 
oversight ( 1 0 ) .  
Many rcfinements of this scheme arc possible. For example, a 
tablc that lists organisms according to safety categories could 
differentiatc spccics within a gcnus or cvcn strains within a spccies as 
having important diffcrcnccs in characteristics and ditfcrcnt levels of  
safcty concern. 
Thc scientific community has concurred that appropriate over- 
sight and rcgulation of b i o t e c l u ~ o l o ~  are justificd and has exercised 
laudable care in thc application of new genetic techniqucs. As a 
result, to our know,ledge not a single untoward e\.cnt has occurred 
\vhile applying them to thc pursuit of basic and commercial rcsearch. 
With the bcncfit of t h e o n  and practicc. oversight and regulaton 
agcncics havc rccvaluatcd and relaxed thcir rcgimes somewhat. 
Continued oversight and rcgulation should bc based 011 thc proper- 
ties of organisms-phenotypes-and not on the techniques em- 
ployed to alter their genetic constinltion. Although consideration of 
processes may be useful to  risk assessment, p r o d ~ ~ c t ,  not process, 
must govern the triggers to  o\rcrsight and rcgulation. LVe proposc 
herc a paradigm for thc ovcrsight of ficld trials that is scientifically 
dcfensiblc ( 1  1 ) .  can bc refined, and is broadly applicable. 
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